feat(coordinator): worker trust tiers (C1) — enroll volunteers, quarantine untrusted

- migration 0012: workers.owner_id + trust_level (trusted/untrusted)
- verifier/authctx read the JWT verified claim; IsTrusted() = admin||verified
- /workers/register resolves trust from auth: service token or verified/admin
  JWT -> trusted; plain user JWT -> untrusted, tagged with owner_id
- claim quarantines untrusted workers (no tasks) until quorum (C2) lands
- unit tests for trust resolution, quarantine, and the verified claim

Additive and backward compatible: shared-token workers stay trusted, so the
existing worker flow and team tests are unchanged. Quorum verification (C2)
is deferred.

coordinator/internal/authctx/authctx.go

@@ -15,13 +15,19 @@ import (
 // Requester at all (From returns ok=false), which is how worker traffic and
 // legacy unauthenticated-user traffic stay owner-less.
 type Requester struct {
-	UserID uuid.UUID
-	Role   string
+	UserID   uuid.UUID
+	Role     string
+	Verified bool
 }
 
 // IsAdmin reports whether the requester may act on any user's jobs.
 func (r Requester) IsAdmin() bool { return r.Role == "admin" }
 
+// IsTrusted reports whether workers this requester registers produce results
+// the coordinator accepts without quorum. Admins and verified contributors are
+// trusted; a plain unverified user is not.
+func (r Requester) IsTrusted() bool { return r.IsAdmin() || r.Verified }
+
 type ctxKey struct{}
 
 // With returns a copy of ctx carrying r.

coordinator/internal/domain/worker.go

@@ -14,14 +14,30 @@ const (
 	WorkerOffline WorkerStatus = "offline"
 )
 
+// WorkerTrust says whether a worker's results are accepted directly or must
+// clear quorum cross-checking.
+type WorkerTrust string
+
+const (
+	// WorkerTrusted — lab machine (shared token) or a verified/admin contributor.
+	WorkerTrusted WorkerTrust = "trusted"
+	// WorkerUntrusted — a plain enthusiast; results are quarantined until quorum.
+	WorkerUntrusted WorkerTrust = "untrusted"
+)
+
 // Worker is a registered process/machine allowed to claim tasks. Its
 // capabilities are the allowlisted workload names it can run; the coordinator
 // never hands it a task outside that set.
 type Worker struct {
-	ID              uuid.UUID
-	Name            string
-	Capabilities    []string
-	Status          WorkerStatus
+	ID           uuid.UUID
+	Name         string
+	Capabilities []string
+	Status       WorkerStatus
+	// OwnerID is the userservice user who registered this worker; nil for a
+	// worker registered with the shared service token.
+	OwnerID *uuid.UUID
+	// TrustLevel decides whether this worker's results need quorum.
+	TrustLevel      WorkerTrust
 	LastHeartbeatAt time.Time
 	CreatedAt       time.Time
 	UpdatedAt       time.Time
@@ -29,6 +45,9 @@ type Worker struct {
 
 // NewWorker registers a worker. A worker with no capabilities could never be
 // handed a task, so an empty set is rejected rather than silently stored.
+//
+// Trust defaults to WorkerTrusted (the shared-token lab worker); the caller
+// overrides it for a volunteer registered through the userservice.
 func NewWorker(name string, capabilities []string, now time.Time) (*Worker, error) {
 	if len(capabilities) == 0 {
 		return nil, ErrInvalidInput
@@ -38,6 +57,7 @@ func NewWorker(name string, capabilities []string, now time.Time) (*Worker, erro
 		Name:            name,
 		Capabilities:    capabilities,
 		Status:          WorkerOnline,
+		TrustLevel:      WorkerTrusted,
 		LastHeartbeatAt: now,
 		CreatedAt:       now,
 		UpdatedAt:       now,

coordinator/internal/storage/postgres/worker_repo.go

@@ -23,13 +23,13 @@ func NewWorkerRepo(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *WorkerRepo {
 	return &WorkerRepo{pool: pool}
 }
 
-var workerColumns = []string{"id", "name", "capabilities", "status", "last_heartbeat_at", "created_at", "updated_at"}
+var workerColumns = []string{"id", "name", "capabilities", "status", "owner_id", "trust_level", "last_heartbeat_at", "created_at", "updated_at"}
 
 func (r *WorkerRepo) Insert(ctx context.Context, w *domain.Worker) error {
 	sql, args, err := psql.Insert("workers").
 		Columns(workerColumns...).
 		// capabilities is a jsonb column; pgx marshals the []string to a JSON array.
-		Values(w.ID, w.Name, w.Capabilities, string(w.Status),
+		Values(w.ID, w.Name, w.Capabilities, string(w.Status), w.OwnerID, string(w.TrustLevel),
 			w.LastHeartbeatAt, w.CreatedAt, w.UpdatedAt).
 		ToSql()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -95,11 +95,13 @@ func scanWorker(row pgx.Row) (*domain.Worker, error) {
 	var (
 		w      domain.Worker
 		status string
+		trust  string
 	)
-	if err := row.Scan(&w.ID, &w.Name, &w.Capabilities, &status,
+	if err := row.Scan(&w.ID, &w.Name, &w.Capabilities, &status, &w.OwnerID, &trust,
 		&w.LastHeartbeatAt, &w.CreatedAt, &w.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	w.Status = domain.WorkerStatus(status)
+	w.TrustLevel = domain.WorkerTrust(trust)
 	return &w, nil
 }

coordinator/internal/token/verifier.go

@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@ import (
 
 // Claims is the subset of a userservice token the coordinator cares about.
 type Claims struct {
-	UserID uuid.UUID
-	Role   string
+	UserID   uuid.UUID
+	Role     string
+	Verified bool
 }
 
 // Verifier checks tokens against the shared HS256 secret.
@@ -32,7 +33,8 @@ func NewVerifier(secret string) *Verifier {
 }
 
 type claims struct {
-	Role string `json:"role"`
+	Role     string `json:"role"`
+	Verified bool   `json:"verified"`
 	jwt.RegisteredClaims
 }
 
@@ -54,5 +56,5 @@ func (v *Verifier) Verify(raw string) (Claims, error) {
 	if err != nil {
 		return Claims{}, fmt.Errorf("token subject is not a uuid: %w", err)
 	}
-	return Claims{UserID: id, Role: c.Role}, nil
+	return Claims{UserID: id, Role: c.Role, Verified: c.Verified}, nil
 }

coordinator/internal/token/verifier_test.go

@@ -11,9 +11,15 @@ import (
 const secret = "coordinator-verify-secret-32-bytes!!"
 
 func sign(t *testing.T, method jwt.SigningMethod, key any, sub, role string, exp time.Time) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	return signVerified(t, method, key, sub, role, false, exp)
+}
+
+func signVerified(t *testing.T, method jwt.SigningMethod, key any, sub, role string, verified bool, exp time.Time) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	tok := jwt.NewWithClaims(method, claims{
-		Role: role,
+		Role:     role,
+		Verified: verified,
 		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
 			Subject:   sub,
 			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(exp),
@@ -26,6 +32,19 @@ func sign(t *testing.T, method jwt.SigningMethod, key any, sub, role string, exp
 	return raw
 }
 
+func TestVerifyCarriesVerifiedClaim(t *testing.T) {
+	v := NewVerifier(secret)
+	raw := signVerified(t, jwt.SigningMethodHS256, []byte(secret), uuid.New().String(), "user", true, time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
+
+	claims, err := v.Verify(raw)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("verify: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !claims.Verified {
+		t.Error("verified claim not read from token")
+	}
+}
+
 func TestNewVerifierNilWhenNoSecret(t *testing.T) {
 	if NewVerifier("") != nil {
 		t.Error("empty secret must yield a nil verifier (auth disabled)")

coordinator/internal/transport/http/handlers.go

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
 
+	"github.com/emil28092005/SciMesh/coordinator/internal/authctx"
 	"github.com/emil28092005/SciMesh/coordinator/internal/domain"
 	"github.com/emil28092005/SciMesh/coordinator/internal/usecase"
 )
@@ -56,10 +57,24 @@ func (s *Server) handleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	worker, err := s.uc.RegisterWorker.Execute(ctx, usecase.RegisterWorkerInput{
+	// Resolve the worker's trust tier from how the caller authenticated:
+	//   - shared service token (no requester) -> trusted lab worker
+	//   - verified/admin user JWT             -> trusted volunteer
+	//   - plain user JWT                      -> untrusted (quarantined)
+	in := usecase.RegisterWorkerInput{
 		Name:         req.Name,
 		Capabilities: req.Capabilities,
-	})
+		TrustLevel:   domain.WorkerTrusted,
+	}
+	if requester, ok := authctx.From(ctx); ok {
+		id := requester.UserID
+		in.OwnerID = &id
+		if !requester.IsTrusted() {
+			in.TrustLevel = domain.WorkerUntrusted
+		}
+	}
+
+	worker, err := s.uc.RegisterWorker.Execute(ctx, in)
 	if err != nil {
 		s.writeError(w, r, err)
 		return

coordinator/internal/transport/http/middleware.go

@@ -70,8 +70,9 @@ func withAuth(token string, verifier *tokenpkg.Verifier) func(http.Handler) http
 			if verifier != nil && presented != "" {
 				if claims, err := verifier.Verify(presented); err == nil {
 					ctx := authctx.With(r.Context(), authctx.Requester{
-						UserID: claims.UserID,
-						Role:   claims.Role,
+						UserID:   claims.UserID,
+						Role:     claims.Role,
+						Verified: claims.Verified,
 					})
 					next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
 					return

coordinator/internal/usecase/dto.go

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import (
 	"io"
 
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
+
+	"github.com/emil28092005/SciMesh/coordinator/internal/domain"
 )
 
 // Use-case boundary types. Adapters map their wire formats onto these, so the
@@ -28,6 +30,11 @@ type ChunkInput struct {
 type RegisterWorkerInput struct {
 	Name         string
 	Capabilities []string
+	// OwnerID is the userservice user registering this worker; nil for a
+	// shared-token registration. TrustLevel is resolved by the transport layer
+	// from how the caller authenticated.
+	OwnerID    *uuid.UUID
+	TrustLevel domain.WorkerTrust
 }
 
 type ClaimTaskInput struct {

coordinator/internal/usecase/task.go

@@ -51,6 +51,13 @@ func (uc *ClaimTask) Execute(ctx context.Context, in ClaimTaskInput) (*domain.Cl
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, err
 		}
+		// C1 quarantine: an untrusted volunteer worker may register but receives
+		// no tasks, because there is not yet (until quorum, C2) any way to verify
+		// its results. Report an empty queue rather than an error, so its poller
+		// simply idles.
+		if worker.TrustLevel == domain.WorkerUntrusted {
+			return nil, nil
+		}
 		// Never trust caller-supplied capabilities: registration is the durable
 		// worker identity and its allowlist.
 		workloads = worker.Capabilities

coordinator/internal/usecase/usecase_test.go

@@ -265,6 +265,71 @@ func TestClaimEmptyQueueReturnsNil(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestRegisterWorkerDefaultsToTrusted(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newHarness()
+	// A shared-token registration carries no owner and no explicit trust.
+	w, err := h.register.Execute(ctx, usecase.RegisterWorkerInput{
+		Name: "lab", Capabilities: []string{"w"},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if w.TrustLevel != domain.WorkerTrusted {
+		t.Errorf("trust = %q, want trusted", w.TrustLevel)
+	}
+	if w.OwnerID != nil {
+		t.Errorf("owner = %v, want nil for a shared-token worker", w.OwnerID)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegisterWorkerRecordsOwnerAndUntrusted(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newHarness()
+	owner := uuid.New()
+	w, err := h.register.Execute(ctx, usecase.RegisterWorkerInput{
+		Name: "volunteer", Capabilities: []string{"w"},
+		OwnerID: &owner, TrustLevel: domain.WorkerUntrusted,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if w.TrustLevel != domain.WorkerUntrusted {
+		t.Errorf("trust = %q, want untrusted", w.TrustLevel)
+	}
+	if w.OwnerID == nil || *w.OwnerID != owner {
+		t.Errorf("owner = %v, want %v", w.OwnerID, owner)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUntrustedWorkerIsQuarantinedFromClaims(t *testing.T) {
+	h := newHarness()
+	h.seedJob(t, "w", 1) // a task is waiting
+	owner := uuid.New()
+	worker, err := h.register.Execute(ctx, usecase.RegisterWorkerInput{
+		Name: "volunteer", Capabilities: []string{"w"},
+		OwnerID: &owner, TrustLevel: domain.WorkerUntrusted,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// Even with a matching task available, an untrusted worker gets nothing:
+	// its results cannot be verified until quorum (C2) exists.
+	claimed, err := h.claim.Execute(ctx, usecase.ClaimTaskInput{WorkerID: worker.ID.String()})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("claim: %v", err)
+	}
+	if claimed != nil {
+		t.Error("untrusted worker must receive no task (quarantine)")
+	}
+
+	// A trusted worker still drains the same queue.
+	trusted, _ := h.register.Execute(ctx, usecase.RegisterWorkerInput{Name: "lab", Capabilities: []string{"w"}})
+	got, err := h.claim.Execute(ctx, usecase.ClaimTaskInput{WorkerID: trusted.ID.String()})
+	if err != nil || got == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("trusted claim = (%v, %v), want a task", got, err)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestClaimRequiresWorkerID(t *testing.T) {
 	h := newHarness()
 	if _, err := h.claim.Execute(ctx, usecase.ClaimTaskInput{}); !errors.Is(err, domain.ErrInvalidInput) {

coordinator/internal/usecase/worker.go

@@ -22,6 +22,13 @@ func (uc *RegisterWorker) Execute(ctx context.Context, in RegisterWorkerInput) (
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
+	w.OwnerID = in.OwnerID
+	// The transport layer resolves trust from the caller's credentials; fall
+	// back to the domain default (trusted) only when it was left unset, so a
+	// zero-value input never silently downgrades a shared-token worker.
+	if in.TrustLevel != "" {
+		w.TrustLevel = in.TrustLevel
+	}
 	if err := uc.workers.Insert(ctx, w); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}

coordinator/migrations/0012_worker_trust.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+BEGIN;
+
+DROP INDEX IF EXISTS ix_workers_owner;
+ALTER TABLE workers DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS trust_level;
+ALTER TABLE workers DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS owner_id;
+DROP TYPE IF EXISTS worker_trust;
+
+COMMIT;

coordinator/migrations/0012_worker_trust.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+BEGIN;
+
+-- Whether a worker's results are accepted directly or must clear quorum.
+-- 'trusted'   — lab machine (shared token) or a verified/admin contributor.
+-- 'untrusted' — a plain enthusiast; results are quarantined until quorum (C2).
+CREATE TYPE worker_trust AS ENUM ('trusted', 'untrusted');
+
+-- Who registered this worker (userservice user id, from the JWT sub). NULL for
+-- workers registered with the shared service token. Not a foreign key: users
+-- live in a separate service/database.
+ALTER TABLE workers ADD COLUMN owner_id uuid;
+
+-- Existing rows were all shared-token lab workers, hence 'trusted'.
+ALTER TABLE workers ADD COLUMN trust_level worker_trust NOT NULL DEFAULT 'trusted';
+
+CREATE INDEX ix_workers_owner ON workers (owner_id);
+
+COMMIT;