Efremenko Arhip
80ff72a0fe
- migration 0012: workers.owner_id + trust_level (trusted/untrusted) - verifier/authctx read the JWT verified claim; IsTrusted() = admin||verified - /workers/register resolves trust from auth: service token or verified/admin JWT -> trusted; plain user JWT -> untrusted, tagged with owner_id - claim quarantines untrusted workers (no tasks) until quorum (C2) lands - unit tests for trust resolution, quarantine, and the verified claim Additive and backward compatible: shared-token workers stay trusted, so the existing worker flow and team tests are unchanged. Quorum verification (C2) is deferred.
61 lines
1.8 KiB
Go
61 lines
1.8 KiB
Go
// Package token verifies the HS256 JWTs minted by the userservice. The
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// coordinator only ever *verifies* — it never issues — so this is a deliberately
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// small counterpart to the userservice's issuer. Verification is local: the
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// shared secret is enough, with no runtime call back to the userservice.
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package token
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import (
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"fmt"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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)
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// Claims is the subset of a userservice token the coordinator cares about.
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type Claims struct {
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UserID uuid.UUID
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Role string
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Verified bool
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}
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// Verifier checks tokens against the shared HS256 secret.
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type Verifier struct {
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secret []byte
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}
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// NewVerifier returns a Verifier, or nil when secret is empty — a nil Verifier
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// means user-JWT auth is disabled and only the shared service token is accepted.
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func NewVerifier(secret string) *Verifier {
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if secret == "" {
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return nil
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}
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return &Verifier{secret: []byte(secret)}
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}
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type claims struct {
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Role string `json:"role"`
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Verified bool `json:"verified"`
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jwt.RegisteredClaims
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}
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// Verify checks the signature and expiry and returns the identity. It pins the
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// algorithm to HMAC, rejecting a token that asks for "none" or an RS256 public
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// key — the classic algorithm-substitution attack.
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func (v *Verifier) Verify(raw string) (Claims, error) {
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var c claims
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_, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(raw, &c, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {
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if _, ok := t.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method: %v", t.Header["alg"])
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}
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return v.secret, nil
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})
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if err != nil {
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return Claims{}, err
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}
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id, err := uuid.Parse(c.Subject)
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if err != nil {
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return Claims{}, fmt.Errorf("token subject is not a uuid: %w", err)
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}
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return Claims{UserID: id, Role: c.Role, Verified: c.Verified}, nil
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}
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